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Who Governs the Family?  
Marriage as a New Test Case of Overlapping Jurisdictions 
John Witte, Jr. and Joel A. Nichols1 
Abstract 
In many areas of law and society, religion and law exercise “overlapping 
jurisdictions.” Often such overlapping claims concern institutions that have both religious 
and political dimensions, such as education and schooling; charity and social welfare; 
and marriage and family life. It is the third of these mixed institutions – marriage and the 
family – that is the focus of this Essay. The headline battles today are over what forms 
of marriage should be recognized by the state: straight versus same sex marriage, 
contract versus covenant marriage, monogamous versus polygamous marriage, and 
more. But an emerging battle concerns not the forms of marriage, but the forums in 
which marriage and family cases are adjudicated. Specifically, the new battle is looming 
over the place of faith-based family laws and religious tribunals. 
Such jurisdictional conflicts have recently resulted in a growing set of “anti-
Shari’a law” statutes, first in Oklahoma and now in Kansas, South Dakota, and 
elsewhere. Such statutes are based on rather slender, if not specious, rationales – and 
on a purported study that has not been sufficiently assessed. We argue, contrary to this 
study, that the very few cases cited by proponents of anti-Shari’a statutes say far more 
about the use of ordinary principles of comity regarding the law of foreign nations, 
respect for the voluntary choices of individuals, and a sense of growing multiculturalism 
in general than they do about any sort of fanciful imposition of Shari'a law on unwitting 
parties. We oppose such anti-Shari'a laws for their targeted discrimination, their 
 
1 John Witte, Jr. is Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law, Alonzo L. McDonald Distinguished Professor, and 
Director of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University. Joel A. Nichols is Associate 
Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota), 
and Senior Fellow, Emory University Center for the Study of Law and Religion.  Portions of this Essay 
were presented at the Faulkner Law Review’s conference on “Overlapping Jurisdictions” in Fall 2012. We 
are grateful to Paul Horwitz and Rob McFarland for their responses to those remarks, and to Faulkner 
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gracious hosts. We also thank Mitchell Gordon and Kristine Kalanges for comments. Allan Tritch provided 
helpful research assistance, especially on anti-Shari’a laws, for which we are grateful. 
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duplication of other laws and decisional norms, their potential conflict with the Federal 
Arbitration Act, and more. 
But hard questions persist that cannot be easily swept away with a mere 
assertion that religious groups should enjoy autonomy over the marriage and family 
affairs of their voluntary faithful. Those are the questions that we have been probing and 
encouraging others to probe in this and prior writings: What are the appropriate lines 
between the civil state and religions with respect to marriage? Civil marriage and 
divorce are perhaps a least common denominator for all citizens, but can there be 
variations if accompanied by base level protections for women and children? And how 
can the state best protect vulnerable members and also advance its liberal ends? Such 
hard questions need not lead to a jurisdictional stand-off between law and religion, 
however, nor to a universal and over-reaching claim by the state. Instead, negotiation, 
compromise, and mutual respect may lead to more nuanced and achievable results – 
especially if we are careful not to be so distracted by conversations about the propriety 
of Shari'a that we miss the actual complications of the growing marital and legal 
pluralism in the United States. 
Keywords: Family law, anti-sharia, marriage, divorce, sharia, jurisdictions, 
multiculturalism, premarital contracts 
 
Introduction 
“Overlapping jurisdictions” – the theme of this symposium – is at the heart of 
some of the most volatile issues that arise under the First Amendment and attendant 
federal and state statutes guaranteeing religious freedom.  The notion of “overlapping 
jurisdictions” includes two broad clusters of issues.  One cluster concerns claims of 
conscientious objection to general laws.  These are headline issues today.  May the 
government require a minister to marry a same-sex or interreligious couple, a medical 
doctor or hospital to perform an elective abortion or assisted-reproductive procedure, a 
pharmacist to fill a prescription for a contraceptive or a morning-after pill, or a private 
employer to carry medical insurance for the same prescription – when all of those 
required actions run counter to those parties’ core claims of conscience or central 
commandments of their faith?  May a religious organization dismiss or discipline its 
officials or members because of their sexual orientation or sexual practices, or because 
they had a divorce or abortion?  May a private religious citizen refuse to photograph or 
cater a wedding, to rent an apartment or car, or offer a general service to someone 
whose lifestyle or relationships they find religiously or morally wanting – especially when 
the state’s laws of civil rights and non-discrimination command otherwise?2  These new 
 
2 See, e.g., Erin N. East, Note, I Object: The RLUIPA as a Model for Protecting the Conscience Rights of 
Religious Objectors to Same-Sex Relationships, 59 EMORY L.J. 259 (2009) (discussing the conflict that 
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contests join older cases of conscientious objection to participate in the military, to 
swear an oath, to work on one’s Sabbath or other holy days, to receive medical 
treatment, or to hire religious outsiders.3  At the heart of all these contests are 
competing claims between the laws of the individual conscience and the laws of the 
organized communities of which that individual is a part.  Whose law governs in 
instances of irresolvable dispute: the law of the state, of the religious community, or of 
the individual’s conscience? 
A second cluster of issues of overlapping jurisdiction and religion concerns the 
governance of institutions that, by their nature, have both spiritual and secular, religious 
and political dimensions.  The classic institutions are education and schooling, charity 
and social welfare, and marriage and family life.  These are what the Western legal 
tradition has long called the res mixta publica – the hybrid institutions of both the private 
and public spheres, of both spiritual and secular life, where religious and political 
authorities have always shared (and often contested) jurisdiction: the power to make 
and enforce their own laws.4  These mixed institutions remain forums for sharp 
jurisdictional contests between religious and political officials in the United States. 
The most perennial and prominent such contests are between private religious 
schools and public state-run schools.  Dozens of Supreme Court cases and thousands 
of lower court cases over the past century have sought to sort out the place of religion in 
public schools, the place of government in private schools, and the wavering lines 
between private and public school faculties, facilities, students, programs, and 
services.5  This is a prime place to find hard cases of overlapping jurisdiction, with a 
headline case appearing every year or two. 
Charity and social welfare are becoming hotter areas of conflict, too.  Beginning 
in the mid-1990s,6 federal and state social welfare policies shifted from the state-centric 
programs inaugurated in the New Deal era half a century earlier to new programs that 
 
can arise between the statutory right of a same sex couple to be free from discrimination and the religious 
liberty of those who object to performing certain services for same sex couples).  See also Richard W. 
Garnett, Understanding the HHS Lawsuits, NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE, Summer 2012, 
http://magazine.nd.edu/news/31400-understanding-the-hhs-lawsuits/;  
 Daniel Philpott, Why Christians Cannot Just “Lighten Up” Over the HHS Mandate, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
PROJECT, http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/why-christians-cannot-just-lighten-up-over-the-hhs-
mandate’  
3 See generally ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE 
BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE (2010). 
4 See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION (1983); HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT 
REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (2003); JOHN WITTE, JR., LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: THE 
LEGAL TEACHINGS OF THE LUTHERAN REFORMATION (2002). 
5 JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 191-222 
(3d ed. 2010). 
6 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare Reform Act), Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
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allow religious communities to play a more prominent role in providing charitable relief 
both at home and abroad.  One of the new programs called “faith-based initiatives“ – 
government programs that fund religious and other private charities to deliver social 
welfare and emergency relief services on the government’s behalf – is the subject of 
growing cultural and constitutional battles today.7  Some object to government financing 
of religious charities, or government use of religious facilities and programs to dispense 
aid and services.  Others object to government interference in the internal organization 
and operations of the religious charities that deliver the tax-funded services.  Those 
battles will likely increase as the modern social welfare net continues to fray, and as 
non-state institutions, including religious ones, either step in or are pushed in to help 
with the growing social fallout and humanitarian needs of our day.   
It is the third of these classic “mixed” institutions beyond schools and charities – 
that of marriage and the family – that is the focus of this Essay.  The headline battles 
today are over what forms of marriage should be recognized by the state – sometimes 
over the objection of religious groups, and sometimes at their insistence: straight versus 
gay marriage, contract versus covenant marriage, monogamous versus polygamous 
marriage, and more.   
But an emerging battle concerns not the forms of marriage, but the forums in 
which marriage and family cases are adjudicated.  Specifically, the new battle is 
looming over the place of faith-based family laws and religious tribunals in our 
democratic system of government – especially ancient and sophisticated religious legal 
systems based on Jewish halacha, Christian canon law, and Muslim Shari’a, among 
others that quietly govern a good number of the family law questions of religious 
believers.8  The question of the legitimacy and authority of these faith-based family law 
systems is lurking just over the horizon of American family law. Muslim laws in particular 
have already become a newly controversial issue at state constitutional law.  
Controversies over the jurisdiction of these religious legal systems will become sharper 
in the years ahead as various religious individuals and groups – often dismayed by the 
marital fragility, family breakdown, and sexual lassitude of modern society – press for 
greater freedom to make judgments about sex, marriage, and family life based on their 
own religious beliefs.   
 
7 See STEPHEN V. MONSMA, PLURALISM AND FREEDOM: FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY (2012); Thomas C. Berg, Religious Organizational Freedom and Conditions on Government 
Benefits, 7 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 165 (2009).  Compare Grote Indus., LLC v. Sebelius, No. 4:12-cv-
001340-SEB-DML WL 6725905, at *6 - *7 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2012) with Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841 
WL 6757353, at *4 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (showing a divide among courts in ruling on whether entities 
are granted exceptions to the Affordable Care Act’s mandate to provide contraceptives). 
8See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: RECONSIDERING THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW 




I. Religion, Marriage, and the State 
For many religious people today – and for many non-religious people, too – 
marriage is “more than a mere contract.”9  It is not merely a private contract between 
two individuals but also an important familial, communal, and even spiritual event.  It is 
not merely an avenue by which the state confers status benefits and burdens on a 
couple, but also a unique marker of fundamental change in a person’s identity and 
responsibility within his or her community.  For many people, the proper formation of a 
marriage thus requires more than compliance with state procedural forms of adequate 
notice, consent, licensing, and registration.  It also requires a religious ceremony before 
a qualified officiant who solemnizes and consecrates the union, with witnesses and a 
celebrating community looking on and promising to help the new couple in their life 
together and in their (hoped-for) roles as parents.  For many people, these communal 
and ceremonial dimensions of marriage are more important as a religious matter than a 
civil matter.  Similarly for them, a marital dissolution is not valid unless and until granted 
by competent religious authorities on adequate grounds that are proven through 
appropriate procedures, recognized and validated within their community.  For such 
people, a statement by the state – of either marriage or divorce – is simply not morally 
weighty or conclusive enough to have binding effect.10 
This is partly because, as Ayelet Shachar and others have argued, individuals 
exercise complex “citizenships” as members of multiple communities.11  They frequently 
possess strong citizenship affiliations to a religious group while also possessing a 
citizenship affiliation to the civil state.  If those two communities lack alignment on a 
critical matter such as marriage or divorce, individuals may feel competing normative 
pulls.  It is not a given that the normative stance of state law will control.12  Sometimes 
 
9 See John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, More than a Mere Contract? Marriage as Contract and Covenant 
in Law and Theology, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 595, 603-606 (2008). 
10 See examples in SEX, MARRIAGE, & FAMILY IN WORLD RELIGIONS (Don S. Browning, M. Christian Green, 
& John Witte, Jr. eds.) (2009). 
11 AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (2001); 
see also Ayelet Shachar, Faith in Law? Diffusing Tensions Between Diversity and Equality, in MARRIAGE 
AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT, supra note 8, at 341. 
12 In the United States, for example, 70% of Muslims “with a high level of religious commitment . . . 
consider themselves to be Muslims first . . . . But among those with a low religious commitment, just 28% 
see themselves this way while a 47% plurality identifies first as American and 12% say they consider 
themselves equally Muslim and American.” PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND 
MOSTLY MAINSTREAM 31 (2007), available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf. 
This is not a uniquely Islamic notion, as a significant portion of American Christians also identify with their 
religion first before identifying with their country. Richard Wike & Greg Smith, Little Support for Terrorism 




the “unofficial law” of the religious or cultural community has a stronger hold on 
individuals than does the sanctioned official civil law of the secular polity.13   
A. Protestant Dilemmas. 
For many conservative Christians today, among other cultural conservatives, the 
norms of sex, marriage, and family in liberal society stand increasingly unaligned with 
traditional Christian norms.  Until recently, American family law generally reflected 
Christian norms, especially Protestant norms of sex, marriage, and family life.14  
Marriage was limited to one man and one woman with the freedom, fitness, and 
capacity to marry each other.  The parties had to be of marriageable age and without 
prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity.  A priest or pastor was vested with the 
authority to preside over the wedding on behalf of both the church and the state.  
Divorce was available only for proven hard fault, with ongoing obligations of care and 
support for the innocent spouse and dependent children.   
This congruence between state law and marital theology corresponded to basic 
Protestant beliefs that the state’s law itself had a constructive teaching function for 
society (concerning the ideals and goods of marriage) as well as a restrictive boundary 
function for its members (concerning who may or may not marry or divorce).15  
American Protestants historically did not maintain church courts to govern their 
marriage disputes – unlike minority Jewish and Catholic communities who maintained 
their beth din and consistory courts with the gradual acquiescence of the states in some 
ways.16  Instead, majority Protestant groups were content to put jurisdiction over 
marriage and divorce in the hands of elected government officials, who were presumed 
to be Christians or, at least, would maintain Christian standards of morality.   
This system of church-state cooperation in the governance of marriage worked 
well enough for most American Protestants until the 1950s.  But with the sexual 
revolution of the culture and the constitution, and the corresponding decline of 
Protestant political and judicial clout, state marriage and divorce laws were rapidly 
liberalized in the later 1960s and thereafter.  Protestants and other conservative Christians 
 
13 Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, 94 IOWA L. REV. 449, 456 (2009); cf. Sarah Beresford, 
Seeking Secularism: Resisting Religiosity in Marriage and Divorce - A Comparative Study of England and 
America, 3 WEB JCLI (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873287 (advocating for a secular 
marriage law and assuming that non-recognition by the state would lead to compliance and adherence to 
civil law norms). 
14 See e.g., JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE 
WESTERN TRADITION 287-88 (2d ed. 2012). 
15 See JOHN WITTE, JR., GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 263-
94 (2006) (discussing uses of the law).  
16 Joel A. Nichols, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward a More Robust Pluralism in 
Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 986-87 (1998); Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: 
Reconsidering the Boundaries of Civil Law and Religion in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL 
CONTEXT, supra note 8, at 11, 15-32. 
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saw a growing dissonance between their traditional marital teachings and the new state 
family law.  The differences were not just about same-sex marriage – the hot topic today 
– but about a host of family issues, including contraception, abortion, and privacy rights 
in general.  Many things have combined to contribute to a cultural conflict for 
conservative Christians, including the onset of no-fault divorce (and the lack of any 
“grandfathering” provisions for those married under other regimes), the adverse effects 
of divorce on weaker parties (especially women and children), the sheer number of 
divorced individuals over the ensuing years, the increased judicial solicitude toward 
cohabitation and non-marital procreation, and the attendant creation of alternative legal 
norms for the same.   
The looming question for conservative American Protestants and Evangelicals 
today is whether it is time to acknowledge that they are rapidly becoming religious and 
political minorities in the United States who lack the clout to bend state policy to their 
moral visions for sex, marriage, and family life.  This is so despite the continued efforts 
of groups like Focus on the Family and their local equivalents today, despite the ample 
new interreligious Marriage Movement with conservative Christians at the lead, and 
despite the earlier successes of the Moral Majority to change state and national policies.  
Those days are numbered, if not over.   
Protestants faced a comparable crisis in the education field a century ago when 
they slowly lost their control of the public schools, especially after the Supreme Court 
got involved after 1948.17  While some have continued to fight to keep religion in the 
public schools, the response of many conservative Protestants has been to set up more 
of their own private Protestant schools to educate their children in the faith.  Perhaps 
conservative Protestants are reaching a comparable crossroads in the marriage and 
family field.  Perhaps it is time for them to develop sophisticated new forms of religious 
mediation and arbitration,18 perhaps even an independent church court system to 
handle some of the marriage and family law issues of their voluntary faithful.  This would 
take massive new political thinking among Protestants about the relationships of church, 
state, and family.  But there are historical prototypes in place in the historical Protestant 
world,19 and there are contemporary analogies at hand among American Jews, 
Catholics, Muslims, and other religious minorities who have lacked either the inclination 
or clout to shape state laws on marriage and family life and have thus quietly operated 
their own religious legal systems.   
B. Islamic Plights and Anti-Shari’a Laws. 
 
17 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 5, at ch. 8.  
18 See generally Amanda M. Baker, A Higher Authority: Judicial Review of Religious Arbitration, 37 VT. L. 
REV. 157 (2012); Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating 
Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011). 
19 See JOHN WITTE, JR. & ROBERT M. KINGDON, SEX, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY LIFE IN JOHN CALVIN’S GENEVA I: 
COURTSHIP, ENGAGEMENT, AND MARRIAGE (2005) (volume II, forthcoming 2013). 
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Ironically, Protestants are now beginning to contemplate this brave new world of 
church, state, and family just at the time when religious tribunals and matters of internal 
religious decision-making are becoming ever more visible and controversial in the 
United States.  The power of Jewish beth din over marriage and divorce within Orthodox 
Judaism has always raised a few constitutional eyebrows, but there has been no 
sustained campaign to eradicate them.20  The power of Fundamentalist Mormon 
communities to maintain polygamous families in open defiance of state criminal laws 
has triggered stronger political reaction, and a growing number of court cases of late are 
challenging the legitimacy of their religious leadership and legal structures.21  The 
recent scandals in American Catholic circles concerning pedophilia and clerical cover-
ups have raised even stronger cultural and legal reactions and a relentless stream of 
litigation that has cost the Catholic Church hundreds of millions of dollars in damage 
awards and out-of-court settlements.22   
But the concerns about the operation of such “overlapping jurisdictions” pale by 
comparison to the growing antipathy against American Muslims and their sophisticated 
legal system called Shari’a.23  Muslims now “represent the second largest religion in 
Europe and the third in North America.”24  But Muslims are also on the receiving end of 
a great deal of cultural antipathy, allegedly because of their religion.  This backlash has 
had a substantial uptick the past decade – after the tragic events of 9/11, followed by 
London’s 7/7, Fort Hood, and the bloody and unpopular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.25   
The public rebuke of Islam in the United States in the past decade has come 
from various quarters.  For example, television commentator Bill O’Reilly compared the 
Qur’an, Islam’s holy book, to Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf.26  Talk radio host Michael 
 
20 See Michael J. Broyde, New York’s Regulation of Jewish Marriage, Covenant, Contract, or Statute? in 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT, supra note 8, at 138. 
21 See JOHN WITTE, JR., WHY TWO IN ONE FLESH? THE WESTERN CASE FOR MONOGAMY OVER POLYGAMY 
(forthcoming). 
22 See, e.g., Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1069-71 (9th Cir. 2009); Moe v. Trustees of Stigmatine 
Fathers, Inc., 24 Mass. L. Rptr. 125 (Mass. Super. 2008); Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of 
Memphis, 363 S.W. 3d 436, 467 (Tenn. 2012). 
23 See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF SHARI’A 
267-93 (2008) (proposing a future course for Shari’a law in western culture).  See also Robert A. Kahn, 
Are Muslims the New Catholics? Europe’s Headscarf Laws in Comparative Historical Perspective, 21 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 567 (2011) (comparing European laws restricting Muslims to anti-Catholic 
policies in Europe and the United States during the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries). 
24 John L. Esposito, Foreword, in MUSLIMS’ PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE xi (Zahid H. Bukhari et 
al., eds., 2004). Islam is the fastest growing religion in America, and some scholars assert that it will be 
the second largest religion in America by the mid 21st century. See generally KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM: A 
SHORT HISTORY (2000); JANE I. SMITH, ISLAM IN AMERICA (1999). 
25 See, e.g., LORI PEEK, BEHIND THE BACKLASH: MUSLIM AMERICANS AFTER 9/11 16 (2011) (“In the aftermath 
of the terrorist attacks, Muslims experienced a dramatic increase in the frequency and intensity of these 
hostile encounters.”). 




Savage told his listeners that lawmakers should institute an “outright ban on Muslim 
immigration” in order to “save the United States”; he also recommended making “the 
construction of mosques illegal in America.”27  An enormous public outcry in 2010 
delayed construction of a mosque near the site of the World Trade Center attacks.28  
Republican presidential hopeful and one-time frontrunner Herman Cain stated that he 
would not hire Muslims as part of his administration; he also firmly opposed the 
construction of mosques, wrongly justifying his stance on First Amendment grounds.29  
And in March 2011, nearly a decade after 9/11/01, U.S. Representative Peter King held 
congressional hearings on terrorism and Islam.30  Indeed, as Professors Gregory Sisk 
and Michael Heise have said, “We are all living in the shadow of 9/11 – but that shadow 
appears to be longer and darker for Muslim Americans.”31  To be sure, there have also 
been calls for accommodation, toleration, and better incorporation of Muslims’ beliefs 
into liberal democracies via dialogue and greater respect for multiculturalism.  But even 
these conversations and actions have tragically given rise to extreme violence at times, 
as witnessed, for example, in Norway when Andres Breivik slaughtered dozens of 
people, ostensibly because they supported the Muslim population in Norway.32 
To date, most political controversies in the United States regarding Islam have 
not centered directly upon family law matters.  They focus instead on the building of 
mosques or on generic charges of the imposition of Shari’a.  A number of states over 
the past three years have debated new laws that ban the application of Shari’a in their 
state legislatures and courts. Oklahoma was the first state to pass such a law in 
 
27 Ryan Chiachiere, Savage: To "save the United States," lawmakers should institute "outright ban on 
Muslim immigration" and on "the construction of mosques,” MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA (Nov. 29, 2006), 
http://mediamatters.org/mmtv/200611290005. 
28 See e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Across Nation, Mosque Projects Meet Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 
2010, at A1.  For part of the vision of Islamic law from the imam primarily behind the mosque, see Imam 
Feisal Abdul Rauf, A Cordoba Initiative Project Justification and Theory of Sharia Law: How The 
American Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights and Constitution are Consistent with Islamic 
Jurisprudence, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 452 (2011).  For a discussion on whether states can regulate 
religious land use, see Heather Greenfield, Comment, International Law, Religious Limitations, and 
Cultural Sensitivity: The Park51 Mosque at Ground Zero, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1317 (2011).  
29 See e.g., Your World Cavuto: Herman Cain Defends Controversial ‘Muslim’ Comments (FOX NEWS 
television broadcast Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/your-world-
cavuto/transcript/herman-cain-defends-controversial-muslim-comments; Gabriella Schwarz, Cain: 
Opposing mosque construction is not discrimination, CNN POLITICAL TICKER (July 17, 2011, 3:22 PM), 
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/17/cain-opposing-mosque-construction-is-not-discrimination/. 
30 David A. Fahrenthold & Michelle Boorstein, Hearing Brings Debate on Islam to the Fore, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 9, 2011, at A5 (contending that the hearings implicitly asked the “most important question: How 
should America talk about Muslim Americans?”). 
31 Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of Post 9/11: Empirical 
Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231, 291 (2012). (showing that Muslims face a 
“distinct and substantial disadvantage” when asserting US constitutional free exercise or religious 
accommodation claims – in addition to the cultural challenges mentioned above). 
32 Miguel Marquez, Norway Shooting Suspect Anders Breivik: Attacks Were ‘Price of Their Treason’, ABC 




November 2010, with its popularly-ratified “Save Our State” Amendment to the 
Oklahoma Constitution.  That amendment was promptly enjoined by a federal court and 
eventually struck down as unconstitutional.33  But more than a dozen other states have 
stepped into the fray.  Kansas and South Dakota recently passed variations of these 
“anti-Shari’a” statutes, and several more states are deliberating about them seriously.34 
The recent movement in Missouri to enact anti-Shari’a legislation exemplifies 
how much these proposed laws have been driven by xenophobia and imagined legal 
worries.  In Missouri, State Representative Paul Curtman proposed a new anti-Shari’a 
law, both in 2011 and in 2012.35  Representative Curtman offered a few prosaic reasons 
for the proposed law when he spoke at a St. Louis symposium in March 2012.36  He 
spoke of the need to “promote liberty” and to make sure Missouri headed off a problem 
before it started.37  When pressed to cite examples of the imposition or use of Shari’a 
that would merit his proposed anti-Shari’a law, however, Representative Curtman failed 
to cite a single Missouri case – and there was, in fact, no Missouri case to cite.  Instead, 
he referenced a “binder” he had with him collecting “dozens” of cases nationwide that 
used Shari’a; those cases, he said, provided him with further reason to sponsor the law.  
The binder, however, contained only a copy of a 635-page document designated 
Shariah Law and American State Courts: An Assessment of State Appellate Court 
Cases [SLASC].38  Because this binder of cases and its analysis is the proffered reason 
for the Missouri law, and because it has been cited in numerous other places as the 
reason behind the need for anti-Shari’a legislation more broadly, it is worth taking a 
closer look at these materials.39   
 
33 See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 2012). 
34 For regular updates and compilations, see Bill Raftery, Bans on court use of sharia/international law: 
signed into law in Kansas, sent to study committee in New Hampshire, still technically alive in MI, NC, PA 
& SC, GAVEL TO GAVEL, (May 29, 2012), http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2012/05/29/bans-on-court-use-of-
shariainternational-law-signed-into-law-in-kansas-sent-to-study-committee-in-new-hampshire-still-
technically-alive-in-mi-nc-pa-sc/.  See also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American 
Courts in 2010: Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey, 59 AM J. COMP. L. 303, 320-21 (2011). 
35 H.R. 1512, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012); H.R. 708, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2011). 
36 Rep. Paul Curtman, Remarks at the St. Louis University Law Review Symposium: Invisible 
Constitutions: Culture, Religion, & Memory (Mar. 1-2, 2012) [hereinafter “SLU Symposium”]; see also 
CAIR Hosts Meeting With Sponsor of Anti-Sharia Legislation, Events/Programs, CAIR Missouri, 
http://cair-stlouis.com/events-and-programs/53-cair-holds-successful-event-with-rep-paul-curtman-a-the-
muslim-community (last visited Feb. 12, 2013) (videos originally posted on YouTube, first video available 
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=q4BTNNhM6Kc).  
37 SLU Symposium, supra note 36. 
38 Sharia Law and American State Courts: An Assessment of State Appellate Court Cases, CENTER FOR 
SECURITY POLICY, (June 21, 2011), http://shariahinamericancourts.com/ [hereinafter SLASC]. 
39 Despite the legislative clamor for anti-Sharia laws and the use of the SLASC document and its 
compilation of cases as rationale for such laws, we have been unable to find any sustained scholarly 
commentary about the SLASC document. There are a few online articles criticizing the report. See, e.g., 




The SLASC document seems to have originated with a single person: David 
Yerushalmi.  Mr. Yerushalmi has a history of arguing quite combatively about the threat 
of Shari’a and is insistent about the need to protect United States courts from foreign 
influence.40  In 2010, Yerushalmi drafted the American Laws for American Courts Act,41 
which was designed to insulate and prohibit state courts from embracing foreign law.42  
After the Oklahoma “Save Our State” Amendment was declared unconstitutional by a 
federal judge, Yerushalmi co-founded the American Freedom Law Center (AFLC) to 
“aggressively fight those who seek to undermine and destroy our Nation’s founding 
principles.”43  SLASC states that it is “based on research and analysis conducted in 
2010 and 2011 by the Center for Security Policy and the offices of the Center’s general 
counsel, attorney David Yerushalmi.”44   
SLASC purports to gather fifty relevant cases to show how United States courts 
are being overrun with Shari’a and are applying Shari’a principles.  But in fact, SLASC is 
simply the product of a perfunctory search of legal databases for the word “Shari’a,” and 
then a reproduction of some selected American cases where the phrase is used.45  In 
the vast majority of cited cases, the civil court does not “rely” on Shari’a in any 
meaningful way, but instead resorts to traditional tools of judicial interpretation and 
neutrally applies the law through principles of contract, comity, and conflict of laws.46   
The stated goal of the SLASC is “to encourage an informed, serious and civil 
public debate and engagement with the issue of Shariah law in the United States of 
 
see also Matthew Schmitz, Anti-Sharia Laws are Magic, The Corner, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 18, 2012, 
12:23PM) http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/303135/anti-sharia-laws-are-magic-matthew-schmitz# 
(calling the SLASC a “flimsy document”). 
40 Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 31, 2011, at A1, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html?_r=3&pagewanted=all (questioning 
Yerushalmi’s lack of formal training in Islamic law even though he has substantial influence in America in 
promoting public discourse about Sharia and promoting anti-Sharia legislation). 
41 American Laws for American Courts, AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY ALLIANCE, (last visited Jan. 6, 2013), 
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/?page_id=38.  The Act is reproduced as Appendix B to SLASC and SLASC 
states that “[v]ersions of the” law have “passed into law in Tennessee, Louisiana and Arizona.” SLASC, 
supra note 38, at 614-615. 
42 David Yerushalmi, LAW OFFICES OF DAVID YERUSHALMI, P.C., About Us, 
http://www.davidyerushalmi.com/aboutus.php (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
43 AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER, http://www.americanfreedomlawcenter.org/home/5/lawyers-join-
forces-to-create-formidable-organization.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). 
44 SLASC, supra note 38, at 9. 
45 SLASC gathered information about state cases via “Google Scholar using search terms including 
‘Islam,’ ‘Islamic’ ‘Muslim,’ ‘Sharia’ and “Shariah.’  Additional search terms were country-specific: ‘Iran,’ 
‘Pakistan,’ ‘Egypt’ and ‘Saudi Arabia,’ all countries with Shariah-centric legal systems.” SLASC, supra 
note 38 at 10.  The problems with this search methodology, terms, and database are too numerous to 
catalog in full. 
46 See Abed Awad, The True Story of Sharia in American Courts, THE NATION, (June 13, 2012) (stating 
that SLASC and supporters of the anti-sharia movement ignore that “whether a US judge considers 
Sharia as a foreign law as in the Exxon case, or as a way to better understand a dispute between parties, 
as in Odatella, the extent of its applicability is always dictated by American law”). 
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America.”47  We join the “debate,” and find the SLASC glaringly wanting.  It lists twenty-
nine cases as “Highly Relevant” and twenty-one cases as “Relevant.”48  In another 
breakdown, it lists the “Top 20” cases of purportedly corrosive Shari’a influence.49  
Whatever the method of selection or priority, a review of the cases themselves says far 
more about the use of ordinary principles of comity regarding the law of foreign nations, 
respect for the voluntary choices of individuals, and a sense of growing multiculturalism 
in general than it does about any sort of fanciful imposition of Shari’a law on unwitting 
parties. 
Only a few of the family law cases in the SLASC merit mention.  The most 
(in)famous case, in the eyes of anti-Shari’a advocates, is S.D. v. M.J.R.50  In a June 
2011 Republican primary debate, Herman Cain cited this case “as proof that ‘there have 
been instances in New Jersey ... where Muslims did try to influence court decisions with 
Sharia law,’”51 and the lead sponsor of the Oklahoma anti-Shari’a statute cited this case 
as evidence of the need for Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” amendment.52  What S.D. v. 
M.J.R. shows, however, is nothing more than that a trial judge can make a reversible 
error.  In this case, a wife sought a restraining order against an abusive husband.53  The 
trial judge denied the result, holding that the husband failed to form the criminal intent 
necessary for abuse because his genuine Islamic religious beliefs supported his 
actions.54  The appellate court reviewed this de novo and reversed and remanded, 
ordering that a restraining order should issue and that the husband’s religious beliefs 
did not immunize him from criminal indictment.55  The trial court was simply wrong, and 
the appellate court performed its requisite reviewing function.  A claim of religious belief 
does not give one license to physically harm another person. 
Several of the family law cases cited as problematic by the SLASC involve 
applications of comity and conflict of laws principles.  For example, in Hosain v. Malik, 
the court upheld a decision by a Pakistani court on a matter of child custody because of 
principles of comity.56  In fact, in Hosain the appellate court affirmed only after 
confirming that the lower court had properly determined the best interests of the child 
 
47 SLASC, supra note 38, at 28. 
48 Id. at 10.  SLASC defines “Highly Relevant” as “upon legal review [the cases] were found to involve 
Shariah in a conflict of law with the Constitutional principles or state public policy at the trial court or 
appellate court level.”  Id.  It defines “Relevant” as “a significant element of Shariah Law was involved at 
the trial court or appellate court level.”  Id. 
49 Id. at 29-42.  It is unclear to us how the “Top 20” was decided. 
50 S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010); SLASC supra note 38, at 29, 468. 
51 Awad, supra note 46. 
52 See A. G. Sulzberger, Voters Face Decisions on  Mix of Issues, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/us/politics/06ballot.html  
53 S.D., 2 A.3d at 413. 
54 Id. at 418. 
55 Id. at 420, 427. 
56 Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); SLASC, supra note 38, at 29-30, 273. 
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and that the Pakistani decision did not conflict significantly with Maryland public policy.57  
Similarly, in Chaudry v. Chaudry, the court held that a divorce that was valid in Pakistan 
should be granted recognition in the United States under principles of comity, even 
though this meant that the wife would not receive alimony in accordance with the 
couples’ premarital agreement.58  In re Marriage of Malak held that a child custody 
decision rendered abroad in Lebanon should be respected in the California court 
because of principles of comity.59  And Nationwide Res. Corp. v. Massabni held that 
foreign law (of Morocco) applied in determining property rights at divorce for a couple 
who was validly married in Morocco, because Moroccan law did not establish 
community property and therefore the wife never gained an ownership interest in the 
marital estate.60  While the outcomes of a few of these cases may be less than optimal, 
the cases feature standard applications of neutral legal principles regarding comity and 
conflict of laws.  The fact that the foreign law being applied was that of a Muslim-
majority nation (which used parts of Shari’a in its state law) does not affect the outcome 
of the case.61 
Other family law cases involve the treatment of the Islamic sadaq as a premarital 
contract.  Akileh v. Elchahal falls into this category.  There the appellate court found that 
“marriage is sufficient consideration to uphold an antenuptial agreement,” and it 
reversed a trial court by finding that “a religious antenuptial agreement may be 
enforceable in a court of law, if it complies with contract law.”62  Other commentators 
have suggested that principles of contract law can work well for resolving disputes 
about religious antenuptial agreements.63  In In re Marriage of Obaidi, for example, a 
court used neutral principles of contract law in refusing to treat an Islamic mahr as a 
prenuptial agreement. The court was troubled that the mahr was written in Farsi and the 
husband did not read or speak Farsi, and he also had insufficient time to review the 
document.64  While one concern in some of the cases involving the sadaq or mahr is the 
 
57 Hosain, 671 A.2d at 315, 319. 
58 Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); SLASC, supra note 38, at 31, 
427 
59 In re Marriage of Malak, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1018 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); SLASC, supra note 38, at 36, 90. 
60 Nationwide Res. Corp. v. Massabni, 694 p.2d 290 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); SLASC, supra note 38, at 32, 
55. 
61 A non-family-law example cited in SLASC is Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochem Co., 
Inc, 866 A.2d 1 (Del. 2005).   SLASC, supra note 38, at 122.  That case also involved foreign law, but in 
fact benefitted two American companies; they were immune from suit because of a U.S. (Delaware) 
statute of limitations that was held to apply rather than the longer available time for a lawsuit in Saudi 
Arabia, which purported to apply Shari’a law.  Id. at 123-55. 
62 Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); SLASC, supra note 38, at 39, 170. 
63 Nathan B. Oman, Bargaining in the Shadow of God’s Law: Islamic Mahr Contracts and the Perils of 
Legal Specialization, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579, 598 (2010).  See also PASCALE FOURNIER, MUSLIM 
MARRIAGE IN WESTERN COURTS: LOST IN TRANSPLANTATION, 109 (2010). 
64 In re Marriage of Obaidi & Qayoum, 226 P.3d 787, 790-91 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010); SLASC supra note 
38, at 30, 574; See also In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to 
enforce a mahr as a premarital agreement based on contract law principles of statutes of frauds and parol 
evidence rule); SLASC supra note 38, at 37, 77. 
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voluntariness of the parties’ agreement, voluntariness is a standard concern for any 
premarital agreement.  If parties voluntarily choose a forum that involves an imam or an 
“Islamic Arbitration Committee” as decision-maker, then such decision could be treated 
as an arbitration award and upheld just as any other award on a neutral basis.65  There 
remains a standard boundary of public policy, whereby courts will not enforce arbitral 
awards from any forum if they contravene public policy. 
The family law cases cited in the SLASC show that United States courts are 
actually less solicitous of Shari’a  precisely because of this public policy boundary.  For 
example, in Aleem v. Aleem,66 the court was faced with a straightforward issue of 
whether a divorce that would have been valid in Pakistan should be recognized in 
Maryland.  The couple had been married in Pakistan in 1980 under Pakistani law, but 
had lived in Maryland for twenty years while retaining their Pakistani citizenship.67  The 
wife filed for divorce in Maryland state court, but before a decree was issued, the 
husband rushed to the Pakistani Embassy and performed the triple talaq (his right of 
unilateral divorce under Shari’a, which would have been recognized as valid under 
Pakistani law).68  The Maryland court did not hold that Shari’a applied, nor even that the 
law of Pakistan applied (even though the husband pronounced talaq on the grounds of 
the Embassy).  Instead, the court held that Pakistani law violated Maryland’s public 
policy – which meant that the Maryland court need not accord the recognition that it 
usually would to foreign law because “to enforce the foreign law . . . would be hurtful or 
detrimental to the interest and welfare of its own citizens.”69  Although the state court 
generally would follow this law as a matter of comity, it was not bound to do so and, in 
fact, declined to do so because of a standard public policy exception.70   
A similar public policy concern was at play in In Re Custody of R.71  In that case, 
the Washington state appellate court held that it was error to enforce, via comity, a 
Shari’a court decision from the Philippines that awarded custody of a child to the 
father.72  That Shari’a court decision had previously been held by the Regional Court of 
the Philippines to be lacking in jurisdiction.73  The state appellate court held that the 
mother should have been allowed sufficient time to produce documentation, that the 
 
65 See, e.g., Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403 WL 930007, *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009) (disallowing 
Islamic divorce from India based on procedural due process concerns); SLASC supra note 38, at 31, 374.  
For a non-family law example, see Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569, 573-574 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) 
(upholding an arbitration award between former business partners where decision was issued by Islamic 
Arbitration Committee, which had authority to decide the dispute per contract of the parties); SLASC 
supra note 38, at 35, 379. 
66 Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489 (Md. 2008); SLASC supra note 38, at 39, 317. 
67 Aleem, 947 A.2d at 491-94. 
68 Id. at 494. 
69 Id. at 498. 
70 Aleem, 947 A.2d at 491. 
71 In re Custody of R., 947 P.2d 745 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); SLASC supra note 38, 33, 557. 
72 In re Custody of R., 947 P.2d at 757-58. 
73 Id. at 751-52. 
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Shari’a court lacked jurisdiction, and that she had a valid custody decree and should 
have been allowed an opportunity to show that the proceedings in Malaysia were 
contrary to the state law and public policy regarding the best interests of the child.74 
We could go on in our analysis of the cases in the SLASC, but simply put, the 
anti-Shari’a campaign it has inspired seems to be “a solution in search of a problem.”75  
This purportedly authoritative resource for supporters of anti-Shari’a laws fails to show 
any real problem that must be addressed.  The SLASC trolls through forty years of 
cases, spanning the appellate courts in all fifty states, in search of Shari’a cases that 
“conflict with the Constitution and state public policy.”76  Finding only twenty-nine “highly 
relevant” cases in this vast sea of cases already says a lot; that none of these cases 
actually reflect a legitimate problem says even more: namely, that the anti-Shari’a 
campaign in the American states is transparently discriminatory in its effort to single out 
Muslims and their laws for special restrictions. Courts have long had a boundary of 
“public policy” when faced with enforcing a contract or other matter that runs afoul of 
accepted civil norms, and many of the examples adduced in SLASC involve the 
navigation of that boundary.  Even more, the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, which renders the Constitution as the supreme law of the land and 
supersedes any other law in conflict, operates as a clear backstop for the wrongful 
imposition of foreign or religious law.  The anti-Shari’a legislation in place in the states 
today is unnecessary, harmful, and most often unconstitutional.   
C. Comparative Examples. 
While Islamic family law issues have not yet been the flashpoint of public anti-
Islam fervor in the United States (outside their application in these anti-Shari’a matters 
more generally), they are in America’s common law cousins, Canada and the United 
Kingdom.  In both places, the focus has been whether to permit Muslims to adjudicate 
family law disputes according to religious principles through religious arbitration.  In both 
places, opposition has centered, in part, on political opposition to the principles of 
Shari’a and the fear of its possible “imposition” upon citizens of those countries.  And in 
both places, Islamic religious arbitration of family law disputes has continued, despite 
opposition.   
 In Canada, Christians, Jews, and Muslims had been submitting their personal 
disputes to religious arbitration for years (using marital contracts that designate a specific 
dispute resolution forum).  But when news broke in the province of Ontario in 2003 that an 
outspoken imam was publicly advocating a more formal procedure to promote the 
application of Shari’a to Canadian Muslims in family law matters, citizens and citizen 
groups complained loudly to the government.  The government commissioned former 
 
74 Id. at 759, 762. 
75 Franck, supra note 39. 
76 SLASC, supra note 38, at 8. 
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Attorney General Marion Boyd to consider the matter.  She undertook a thorough 
investigation that culminated in a lengthy report about the use of alternative dispute 
resolution in family law, including the use of religious norms (e.g., Shari’a) as a choice of 
law in family law arbitration. 77  Attorney General Boyd recommended that Ontario should 
continue to allow religious arbitrations – on the condition that certain safeguards be 
implemented and followed to ensure proper consent and fairness.78  Contrary to this 
recommendation, in 2005 political leaders removed the legal option of applying any 
religious principles and insisted that there would be “one law for all Ontarians.”79 
In the United Kingdom, Archbishop Rowan Williams gave an important speech on 
the intersection of civil and religious law in February 2008.  In that speech, he suggested 
that some sort of “accommodation” of Shari’a by British common law was “unavoidable.”80  
For both pragmatic and substantive reasons, he advocated a sort of “plural jurisdiction,” 
according to which Muslims could resolve family law disputes (and some other civil 
matters) either in British courts or in religious arbitration tribunals.81  His remarks gave rise 
to a flurry of articles, the vast majority denouncing the idea – in part because it would 
“license polygamy.”82  Despite the cries of many critics, however, the Archbishop was not 
advocating a wholesale abdication of the state’s marriage and divorce law, but rather 
calling for a constructive conversation about the complex citizenships exercised by Muslim 
believers.  Rather than engage in productive dialogue about this difficult issue, many in the 
popular press instead merely aired unrealistic concerns about the wholesale takeover of 
British law for everyone (or at least for some British citizens) by Shari’a.   
The facts on the ground in Canada and the United Kingdom underscore the 
impossibility of the civil law claiming full allegiance and commitment from religiously-
devout citizens, including Muslims.  In Canada, while Ontario provincial law is uniform 
and courts will not enforce family arbitrations that purport to apply religious law, this 
does not mean that religious arbitrations have ceased.  Rather, Attorney General Boyd 
has reported that Muslim arbitrations have “merely becom[e] invisible to official law 
without ceasing operations.”83  And in the United Kingdom, one of the main reasons 
 
77 See MARION BOYD, OFFICE OF CANADIAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: 
PROTECTING CHOICE, PROMOTING INCLUSION (2004), available at 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf. 
78 Id. at 133. 
79 See Prithi Yelaga & Robert Benzie, McGuinty: No Sharia Law, THE TORONTO STAR, (Sept. 12, 2005), at 
A1. 
80 Rowan Williams, ARCHBISHOP’S LECTURE – CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LAW IN ENGLAND: A RELIGIOUS 
PERSPECTIVE, Feb. 7, 2008, reprinted in SHARI’A IN THE WEST 293, 298 (Rex Ahdar and Nicholas Aroney, 
eds., 2010).   
81 Id. at 302. 
82 ’’See, e.g.,Catherine Bennett, It’s One Sharia Law for Men and Quite Another for Women, THE 
OBSERVER (THE GUARDIAN (U.K.)), Feb. 10, 2008 (“licensed polygamy”). 
83 Prakash Shah, A Reflection on the Shari’a Debate in Britain, 13 STUDIA Z PRAWA WYZNANIOWEGO 
(STUDIES OF ECCLESIASTICAL LAW) 71 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1733529 (citing Marion Boyd, “The Past, Present 
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behind Archbishop Williams’s speech was the reality that a very high percentage of 
Muslims already lack alignment between their civil and religious marriages.  For 
example, one study indicated that 27% of all Muslim marriages in the United Kingdom 
are not officially married under English law.84  (This mirrors the experience of many 
Orthodox Jews in New York who also marry and divorce only under religious law, and 
not according to the civil law.85) 
D. In Search of a Middle Way 
In earlier writings, separately and together, we have tried to respond 
constructively to the growing controversy over the use of Shari’a family law and Muslim 
marriage tribunals in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other 
Western democracies.86  Our main effort in these writings has been to counsel against 
the constitutional brinkmanship we saw emerging on both sides – on the one hand, the 
effort by anti-Shari’a critics in Oklahoma and elsewhere to pass state constitutional 
amendments against Shari’a, and, on the other hand, the constitutional rights 
arguments pressed by some advocates to allow for voluntary use of Shari’a on grounds 
of religious freedom, non-discrimination, and self-determination.  We agree that adults 
have a fundamental right to be married and divorced and that religious parties have a 
fundamental right to religious freedom and equal treatment.  But this does not mean that 
religious tribunals have the fundamental right to govern the marriage and family 
questions of their voluntary faithful nor that religious parties have the free exercise right 
to choose which family law governs them: the state’s or that of their own religious 
community.  The state, we argued, cannot simply cede jurisdiction over so fundamental 
an institution as marriage that is so deeply woven into sundry other public, private, 
penal, and procedural laws.  But the state can and should share marital jurisdiction with 
religious officials by allowing religious officials to preside at weddings, testify in divorce 
 
and Future of Arbitration in Religious Contexts: Reflections on Ontario Law in a Comparative Context.” 
Lecture given at the Institute of Advanced Studies, London (July 10, 2009)). 
84 SONIA NÛRÎN SHAH-KAZEMI, UNTYING THE KNOT: MUSLIM WOMEN, DIVORCE AND THE SHARIAH 31 (2001). 
For further background, see generally GILLIAN DOUGLAS ET AL., SOCIAL COHESION AND CIVIL LAW: 
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND RELIGIOUS COURTS (Cardiff 2011); Farrah Ahmed, Religious Tribunals, Religious 
Freedom, and Concern for Vulnerable Women, in CHILD AND FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY (2012) (describing 
the “current legal position in the United Kingdom”); John R. Bowen, How Could English Courts Recognize 
Shariah? 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 411 (2010) (describing interactions between Muslim arbitration tribunals 
and English legal system). 
85 See Broyde, supra note 20, at 161. 
86 E.g., John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Faith-Based Family Laws in Western Democracies?, FIDES ET 
LIBERTAS 119-132 (2010); John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, The Frontiers of Marital Pluralism: An 
Afterword, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT, supra note 8, at 357; John Witte, Jr., 
Shari’ah’s Uphill Climb, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Nov. 20, 2012 9:08 AM), 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/november/shariahs-uphill-climb.html; see also John Witte, Jr., 
The Future of Muslim Family Law in Western Democracies, in  SHARI’A IN THE WEST, supra note 8, at 279; 
Joel A. Nichols, Multi-tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from New York and Louisiana to the 
International Community, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 135 (2007). 
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cases, assist in the adoption of a child, facilitate the rescue of a distressed family 
member, preside in mediation and arbitration proceedings, and perhaps more.   
Our further effort in these earlier writings was to invite American parties to take a 
longer historical and developmental view of this new jurisdictional contest over marriage 
and family life.  Marriage has long been both a spiritual and temporal institution in the 
history of the West, and changes in religious and political jurisdiction over marriage 
have always taken time, patience, negotiation, and experimentation.  In American 
history, this has occurred by what Professor Steven Smith has aptly called “soft 
constitutional” developments that depend heavily upon gradual and skillful cultural 
negotiation outside of the formal instruments of state law and beyond the purview of 
constitutional law.87  American Catholics and Jews have, for two centuries and more, 
used this technique to balance the marital jurisdictional claims of their own religious 
communities with those of their state sovereigns.  And they now have sophisticated 
tribunals that govern some of the hard family law questions of their voluntary members.  
American Protestants, Evangelicals, and Muslims are now slowly learning to do the 
same.  Each religious group can learn from the other in developing these necessary 
skills of cultural and legal navigation.88  They can also learn from the examples of earlier 
American jurisdictional struggles over education that slowly gave rise to the shared 
public and private school system we have in place today. 
Some critics like Eric Kniffin have charged that our writings about Muslims 
suggest that we believe “the free exercise of religion is something less than a 
fundamental – even inalienable – right.”89  This criticism misses the mark.  We 
fundamentally believe that free exercise rights and other religious freedoms are at the 
heart of the human rights regime; indeed, we have contended for this forcefully and at 
length elsewhere.90  But that begs the question of what practices are protected by free 
exercise rights, especially in the field of marriage and family life.  Not all family actions 
by religious individuals and groups can be viewed as exercises of religious rights.  It 
also begs the question of what limits the state can justifiably impose on the exercise of 
those rights that are deemed within the realm of free exercise for religious individuals 
and/or religious groups.  Surely, the state may and must step in to help vulnerable 
 
87 See generally Steven D. Smith, Nonestablishment, Standing, and the Soft Constitution, 85 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 407 (2011). 
88 Jean-Francois Gaudreault-DesBiens, Religious Courts, Personal Federalism, and Legal Transplants, in 
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individuals – especially women, children, the elderly or disabled – from physical harm 
done to them by their family members in the name of religion.  Surely a religious 
community cannot get carte blanche religious freedom to devise and implement rules of 
spousal support, child custody, or inheritance if those rules systematically harm some 
members of the family or protect incest, polygamy, or rape.  The hard questions are to 
articulate just where the lines are between state regulation and religious freedom, 
especially when a given family practice harms other citizens.  The right of religious 
freedom for individuals and groups, within the family sphere, is the beginning, not the 
end of the matter. 
Other critics like Matthew Schmitz allege that our effort to describe the problems 
with blindly accepting Muslim and other religious family laws and tribunals effectively 
serves as a “defense of anti-shari’a legislation.”91  Far from it.  We oppose such anti-
Shari’a laws for their targeted discrimination, their duplication of other laws and 
decisional norms, their potential conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act, and more.  
Professors Paul Horwitz and Robert McFarland, who are part of this Symposium, are 
surely right in saying that the first generation of anti-Shari’a laws (like Oklahoma’s) were 
patently unconstitutional for wrongly singling out “Shari’a” for special restrictions.92  That 
violates elementary First Amendment prohibitions on religious discrimination under both 
the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses.93  The second generation of anti-Shari’a 
laws are more nuanced; they do not mention “Shari’a” at all, but rather seek to preempt 
use of any “foreign” or other law.  Such laws are redundant, however, of the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution.  They are also discriminatory in their efforts to 
single out Muslim Shari’a even while allowing Jews, Christians, and other religious 
communities to retain their “foreign” laws.94  So even if these second generation 
statutes are constitutional, they are still problematic from a civil society perspective 
because they alienate, if not target, Muslims for no real gain.95   
But hard questions persist that cannot be easily swept away with the assertion 
that religious groups should enjoy autonomy over the marriage and family affairs of their 
 
91 Matthew Schmitz, Christianity Today’s Dead-Wrong Defense of Anti-Sharia Laws, FIRST THOUGHTS, 
(Nov. 20, 2012 2:56 PM), http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2012/11/20/christianity-todays-
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92 See articles by Paul Horwitz and Robert L. McFarland in this Issue of the FAULKNER LAW REVIEW.  
93  That is clear discriminatory intent in violation of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520 (1993). See also Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First Amendment Analysis of Anti-Sharia 
Statutes, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363 (2012). There are other problems that are too numerous to 
mention, including that the statute seemingly even outlaws the mention of Blackstone, if one follows its 
explicit statutory text. 
94 See Awad, supra note 46 (describing Kansas’s new second general anti-Shari’a law and its 
discriminatory intent, and quoting a state senator who said, “This [bill] doesn’t say ‘Sharia law’ . . . but 
that’s how it was marketed back in January and all session long – and I have all the emails to prove it.”). 




voluntary faithful.96  Those are the questions that we have been probing and 
encouraging others to probe.  What are the appropriate lines between the civil state and 
religions with respect to marriage?  Can there be a place for “new legal pluralism in the 
domain of intimacy”?97  Civil marriage and divorce are perhaps a least common 
denominator for all citizens, but can there be variations once base level protections for 
women, children, and other vulnerable members of the household are in place?98  What 
exactly would such base level protections be?  How can the state best protect 
vulnerable members and also advance its liberal ends?  Which “citizenship” will affected 
individuals follow when jurisdictions overlap – religious or civil?  The debate about the 
propriety of Shari’a should not distract us from the actual complications of growing 
marital and legal pluralism in the United States. 
II. Possible Paths Ahead 
Professor Brian Tamanaha recently wrote: “The longstanding image of a uniform 
and monopolistic law that governs a society is plainly obsolete.”99  If this is a true 
description of our modern legal condition, what does it mean for American family law?  
Will we find ways to recognize and accommodate believers with differing 
understandings of marriage and divorce?  Given the dissonance internal to family law 
for many religious believers, including (increasingly) for Muslims in the United States, 
what are the possible avenues for interaction between civil law and religion in the United 
States?100  Four possibilities suggest themselves.101   
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First, and perhaps the most extreme, is to “take the state out of the business of 
deciding what is a marriage and leave that question to the churches” and other religious 
groups.102  This approach would attempt to divide conclusively the notions of “civil 
marriage” and “religious marriage,” which lie at the heart of many of the debates about 
marriage.  It would disentangle the state from the religious aspects of marriage and 
emphasize the state’s higher priority of equality. It would accomplish this, presumably, 
by enacting civil unions.  Proposals of this sort have been floated by those on both the 
left and the right of the political spectrum.103  Whatever its merits, this proposal seems 
like a non-starter.  A similar proposal was debated in Canada (which is often more 
liberal on family law matters than most American states), but gained very little political 
traction even there.104  
Second, a quite different approach is that the state remain involved in regulating 
marriage – but do so according to a majority’s particular religious, moral, or political 
views.  This used to be the avenue of choice for Protestant Christians, but it increasingly 
has led to conflict as society has become more liberal in its laws governing both 
entrance to and exit from marriage, and conservative Christian groups have felt 
alienated.  This alienation has been substantially exacerbated by the same-sex 
marriage debates over the past decade and more, and it has reignited the culture wars.  
There have been DOMAs, state level mini-DOMAs, state court decisions in favor of 
same-sex marriage, sometimes (as in California) democratic reversal of such decisions, 
and, occasionally (as in New York), democratic instatement of the possibility of same-
sex marriage.  Perhaps these winner-take-all political battles will continue to be the 
norm.  But, at present, they show little promise of settling on one position.105 
Third, a variation on the option of instantiating one set of religious values into a 
single and exclusive governing law for marriage and divorce would be to offer different 
models and regimes of marriage that that are animated by different religious beliefs, and 
let the parties choose one.  Louisiana’s “covenant marriage laws” are an example of 
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this: couples choose either a regular contract marriage with easy entrance and no-fault 
divorce or a covenant marriage, which requires premarital counseling and other 
entrance requirements with correspondingly higher exit requirements.  Or a state might 
offera blend of civil and religious marriage/divorce norms and procedures for its citizens.  
New York’s get statutes are an example of this model, which prevent Orthodox Jewish 
couples from divorcing at state law unless and until they are divorced at Jewish law – an 
“invisible dance,” as Professor Michael Broyde calls it.106  But neither covenant marriage 
statutes nor legislatively enacted get statutes seem promising practically.  Only three 
states have enacted covenant marriage statutes (and none since 2001), and only a few 
couples in those states have availed themselves of the covenant marriage option.  
Moreover, no state besides New York has passed a get statute despite other attempts 
in the past twenty years.107 
A final option is for the state to show more solicitude for the private choices of 
dispute resolution set out by marital couples in their pre- and post-marital 
agreements.108  Currently, marital parties may agree in advance to arbitrate any marital 
disputes rather than litigate them.  That choice of forum provision in a prenuptial 
agreement is typically enforceable.  But, as can be seen in Ontario and the United 
Kingdom, the growing presence of arbitration done by religious authorities is making 
these agreements more controversial.  Even more controversial would be the parties’ 
agreement to choose the law that governs within that chosen forum – state law or 
religious laws.  Having such a choice of law within the arbitration tribunal would make it 
easier for parties to align their commitments as both religious and political citizens.  But 
such religious arbitration, especially on choice of law matters, would itself likely be 
contested by the state, especially if the religious laws used displace the state’s norms 
and aspirations for gender equality, the best interest of the child, or more.109  Religious 
arbitration is getting more scholarly attention of late,110 and the topic will likely yield 
more articles and court opinions as American society becomes ever more mobile and 
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multicultural.  Whether American courts will treat religious arbitrations of family law 
matters the same as they treat arbitrations of other matters is still an open question.111 
One avenue that is not viable, however, is to presume that Professor Tamanaha 
is incorrect and that, in family law matters, there can be one “uniform and monopolistic 
law”112 enforced throughout the land.   We would be better served to recognize, as 
Professor Werner Menski has said, that “perhaps we must all be conscious pluralists, 
whether we like it or not.”113  This means that we must realize that “unofficial law” will 
operate regardless of what the civil law says.114  That is, some individuals are going to 
feel themselves bound by their communal (religious) norms regardless of what the civil 
law says.  And some individuals are going to seek religious adjudication of their 
disputes (as Muslims in Ontario and the United Kingdom do), even if the civil law 
refuses to enforce those arbitral judgments.  Failing to understand these matters means 
that a liberal state may protect vulnerable parties the least when the state claims and 
seeks to exercise hegemonic control over marriage and divorce and when it passes 
anti-Shari’a statutes.  Instead, it may be that only through recognizing and respecting 
alternate norm systems may the state have more of an avenue to influence change and 
protect vulnerable parties.115 
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